Abstract In our high-tech society, the design process involves profound questions about the effects of the resulting goods, and the responsibilities of designers. In the philosophy of technology, effects of ''things'' on user experience and behaviour have been discussed in terms of the concept of technological mediation. Meanwhile, what we create has moved more and more towards services (processes) rather than products (things), in particular in the context of information services. The question is raised to what extent the concept of technological mediation is adequate to understand effects and responsibilities in information services as well. Therefore, this paper discusses differences between product aspects and service aspects of our creations, and evaluates the applicability of the concept of technological mediation to information services. Specific features of a notion of technological mediation for information services are highlighted, in particular with respect to the different relation between production and consumption. Finally, the paper focuses on the ethical consequences of service impact, and recommendations for service providers, especially in terms of the possibilities for second-order mediation by inviting users to change service properties.
Introduction

Background
In one of his famous (and notorious) quotes, Heidegger said that ''the thing things'' (Heidegger 1971, 174) . Philosophers of technology have followed up on this statement as a credo for focusing on the effect of concrete artefacts rather than an abstract notion of technology (Verbeek 2005) , and the role of the designer in such effects. Especially in the domain of what is called postphenomenology, this has led to studies on the mediating role of things in our experience and existence (Ihde 1990) .
However, although the empirical turn towards ''the things themselves'' resolved the bias of the ''old'' philosophy of technology towards abstract conceptions of technology, it seems to carry another bias. Especially from the perspective of economics, not everything that is produced can be classified as a ''thing'', ''artefact'' or ''product''. In particular this concerns the class of services, which we will define more precisely later. As an example, consider Facebook and similar social networking services. Can the influence of such services on the relation between people and their world be described and discussed with the same concepts used to describe the mediating effect of binoculars or speed humps? In this paper, I will argue that the answer should be no.
Postphenomenology does discuss services, but the perspective there seems to be that services are possible addons to products. This ''maintenance'' perspective shows up when Verbeek discusses how to make products more sustainable by adding services (Verbeek 2006) . However, services are never discussed as mediating entities themselves. The reliance of postphenomenology on ''thinging things'' thus fails to cover a range of designed phenomena, which I will-hesitantly because of the Heideggarian terminology, but also intentionally to point to the importance of his phrase-call ''serving services''. Like thinging things, the phrase draws attention to what the design does to the user, or society. Moreover, the use of the verb ''to serve'' also points to the fact that a service (or a thing, for that matter) always serves some interests or values more than others.
Research question
What is missing, then, is a systematic study of the extent to which technological mediation is similar or different for services, and what this means for designing desirable use into services, or preventing undesirable use. Therefore, this paper discusses differences between product aspects and service aspects of our creations, and the applicability of the concept of technological mediation to information services is evaluated. Finally, suggestions are developed to adapt the concept of technological mediation in an information service context.
Method and scope
I take a philosophical and ethical perspective here, which can be contrasted with a marketing perspective. In a marketing perspective, the focus is on how to align customer needs and the organisation's strategy (Goldstein et al. 2002) . In the philosophical discussion presented here, the emphasis is on understanding how technology changes society. In particular, I focus on ways in which services change the experience and behaviour of users. These terms have a precise and distinguished meaning in a postphenomenological context, which will be shown in the next section. Furthermore, the ethical consequences are framed in terms of values and responsibilities. The notion of ''values'' as used in this paper refers to moral values, not economic value. Values are thus interpreted as ''what a person or group of people consider important in life'', as in the notion of value-sensitive design (Friedman et al. 2006) . Responsibilities refer to obligations to protect or strengthen such values. In this sense, the present work does adopt a design perspective (Dorst 2011; Wieringa 2009 ), but with a postphenomenological focus on human-world relations. This philosophical perspective complements existing work on service quality from a marketing perspective (Seth et al. 2005 ).
I use the term ''goods'' as an overarching term covering phenomena that are being produced to provide value (economic or otherwise) to consumers. Both products and services are considered goods. Also, the distinction between products and services is not a dichotomy, as many goods have characteristics of both products and services. From the perspective of product-service systems, goods can consist of combinations of products and services, where products and services are ends of a spectrum (Tukker 2004) . From the perspective of service-dominant logic, service (in the singular) is the provision of benefits in any form, and products are one particular way to do this, representing a durable, frozen, indirect form of service provisioning (Vargo and Lusch 2008) . Things or artefacts, in turn, can be thought of as tangible products. I will come back to this issue when discussing the distinction in more detail in section ''Products versus services''.
Many different properties have been ascribed to services as opposed to products, but one key definition is that services, contrary to products, cannot be owned (Lovelock and Gummesson 2004) , and that there is no transfer of ownership in service provisioning. For example, purchasing cloths transfers ownership, but purchasing a dry cleaning service does not. Here, I am primarily concerned with services that have some additional characteristics. The reason is that a ''new'' class of services has emerged over the last decades that seems to have an especially profound impact on our experience and actions, which is the class of information services. I will focus on these services for the major part of the article, in order to keep the argument as clear as possible. In the conclusions, I will discuss generalisability to other services.
Two properties of information services are key in this paper. Firstly, information is ''intangible'' in the sense that the information itself has no physical appearance, although it needs to be stored on a physical medium. In the early days of personal computing, people would buy hardware products, as well as software products that would run on this hardware. Also, original pieces of information and copies thereof, for example music, could be sold as products, and both product software and ''product data'' were intangible products (Hill 1999) . Increasingly, this paradigm has been replaced with what is called Service-Oriented Architecture (Erl 2007) , where both hard-and software can be rented rather than owned. For example, one can rent processing power on the Internet, or subscribe to an online bookkeeping system. This culminated in the new hype of cloud computing, where basically everything is ''in the cloud'' rather than owned by consumers, except some device with a web browser installed. Also, music streaming services such as Spotify replace customer-owned (product) copies of music.
Secondly, these information services all exhibit an entanglement of production and consumption. This has been termed ''inseparability'', and although this characteristic does not apply to all services (a laundry service does not need to serve a customer real-time; Lovelock and Gummesson 2004) , information services seem to be impossible without a server that processes the requests of the client immediately. Even when computing tasks would be outsourced like laundry (i.e. only direct interaction during delivery), there is still a fundamental aspect of inseparability in the sense that the provider knows exactly what customers do with the service, whereas a product producer lacks this information after ownership has been transferred. Also, interaction with other users has become common in online games, social networking services, and recommender systems for e-commerce.
I choose technological mediation/postphenomenology as a framework, because it seems to be ideally positioned to discuss the role of services in the relation between people and their environment. As information services, by providing information, primarily impact how users interpret their environment and how they act within this environment, this is the central mechanism that is the focus of evaluation of effects and desirability of effects. Moreover, it seems obvious that information services have profoundly changed our experience of the world in the last decade. Social networking services, such as LinkedIn and Facebook, will be the running example in this article.
Technological mediation is the central concept that I will re-interpret from an information service context, and this re-interpretation is the main contribution of this paper. Depending on the perspective, this can be seen as an application of technological mediation to a different class of goods (namely services as opposed to products), or a generalisation of technological mediation to a more extensive class of goods (namely services including products). The re-interpretation is then followed by an analysis of implications for responsibilities of producers and consumers.
This paper does not focus on the methods of service design. There is already some excellent work on this, including participatory design for services (Holmlid 2009 ). Rather, it discusses how services, once designed, influence humanworld relations, and what this means for responsibilities of stakeholders. The link between these responsibilities and design methods could be investigated in follow-up work.
Paper overview
In section ''Product impact'', I will discuss in more detail the concepts of product impact and technological mediation. In section ''Products versus services'', I will summarise the differences between products and services as discussed in the literature, and distill the aspects that require a re-interpretation of technological mediation for services. In section ''Service impact'', I will outline a philosophy of service impact, by evaluating what is different for each of the stakeholders in an information service context. In section ''Mediation revisited'', consequences for a concept of technological mediation for information services are discussed. In section ''Ethical implications'', ethical implications for the stakeholders are investigated in terms of responsibility. Finally, the conclusions in section ''Conclusions'' summarise the results and discuss generalisability to other types of services.
Product impact
Hard and soft impact Products change our world in many different ways. In the literature, two main types of product impact are recognised: Boenink et al. (2010) distinguish between hard and soft impacts of technological artefacts. Hard impacts, according to the authors, are the effects of technology on health, environment and safety. In such effects, human behaviour plays only a minor role, if any. And if it plays a role, it is unintentional human error that causes harm, not intentional actions. Therefore, the designers can be held responsible for negative consequences that are entailed by their designs. For example, car manufacturers will call their products back for maintenance if they discover safety problems with, say, the brakes.
Soft impacts, by contrast, denote ''the way technology influences, for example, the distribution of social roles and responsibilities, moral norms and values, or identities''. Boenink et al. give two reasons why soft impacts are not easily accepted by designers as part of their responsibility. Firstly, there is less of a consensus on what desirable consequences are in this domain: people may strive for different values, and it may be impossible to find universal norms on what impact needs to be achieved. Secondly, as the impact is mediated by human behaviour, responsibilities could be said to lie with the users of the products. For example, gun manufacturers may state that their products can be used for both good and bad purposes, and therefore reject responsibility for changing their products to prevent undesirable usages. In this view, the technology designed would be considered neutral, and only gain moral significance when applied by users in their morally laden actions.
Technological mediation
This anthropocentric neutrality thesis, where technology is merely a means, was characteristic of the optimistic view on human progress by means of newly acquired powers On thinging things and serving services 197 after the scientific revolution (Achterhuis 2001) . It also seems the default view when strictly separating the human and the material world, characteristic of modernity (cf. Latour 2004) . However, the past century has seen many developments challenging precisely this thesis. Traditional philosophy of technology emerged from the insight that technology is not neutral, in the sense that it is only a means to achieve pre-defined human ends. Instead, technology itself changes the ends that it was meant to achieve. Often, such analyses treat technology as a single phenomenon, alien and potentially damaging to human nature (as well as the environment) (Winner 1977) . Since then, the so-called empirical turn in the field has drawn attention to the role that concrete artefacts play in the way humans perceive the world and structure their life (Achterhuis 2001) . This approach also indicates that our goals change depending on the means that we have, but it provides a more concrete and less massive view on the role of technology in our world. This enabled philosophers to avoid the abstract and mainly negative conclusions of their predecessors, while still being able to uphold the claim that technology is far from neutral. For example, mobile phones have changed both the way we perceive the world and the way we act in social relations, and they have created new ends that people may want to achieve with again new technological features.
In particular, the movement of postphenomenology has addressed such issues. From this perspective, the basis of human-world relations is the entanglement of subject and object, or even the co-constitution of subject and object, as opposed to psychological notions of experience in relation to an objective world. Within this movement, the focus lies on the relation human-world, called the intentional relation, and the roles that technological artefacts can play in this relation, in terms of influencing experience (the interpretation of the world). This is often expressed as I-technology-world (Fig. 1) . From a different perspective, pragmatist conceptions of experience have led to similar initiatives (Wright et al. 2005) . These approaches provide a concrete way to account for the soft impacts of technology, by studying the effects of concrete designs on the way we experience and structure our lives. Ihde (1990) stated that artefacts can change the relation between humans and the world by mediating experience (our interpretation of the world through our perception), and distinguished four possible roles that things can have in this relation. In the embodiment relation (1), an artefact is used to extend bodily capabilities, such as when using binoculars. In the hermeneutic relation (2), an artefact is used to provide information about the world, such as when reading a thermometer. In the alterity relation (3), humans relate to the technology itself, rather than to the world via the technology, such as when getting angry at a computer. Finally, in the background relation (4), technology serves as a background phenomenon for our relation to the world, for example in the use of heating systems. Due to their role in these relations, technologies may change our relation to the world by amplifying or reducing certain aspects of experience. This is rather trivial with the binoculars (I can see more, but also less), but it may also happen at a cultural level, as in the mobile phone example.
Where Ihde focuses on experience, Latour (1992 Latour ( , 2005 ) engages with how artefacts can change the way we act. According to Latour, actions are performed by a complex of actors, involving both humans and things. For example, a man cannot shoot without a gun, but neither can a gun shoot without a man. It is their combination that makes certain actions possible or impossible, or, in a softer form, makes certain actions likely and others unlikely. In this combination, the human influences the actions of the thing, and the thing influences the actions of the human. The thing part of the influence has also been termed ''script'' (Latour 1992, 259-260) . In this sense, speed humps or bulky key rings in hotels also change our actions. Verbeek (2005) has described these effects in terms of what he calls technological mediation. This perspective integrates Ihde's mediation of perception and Latour's mediation of action. Things can amplify or reduce certain aspects of experience (direction world-human), and invite or inhibit certain actions (direction human-world). These are termed the hermeneutic and existential aspects of mediation, respectively. Still, mediation is not often deterministic; rather, although suggesting certain directions, humans can decide to use technologies in other ways. This framework of technological mediation thus provides a vocabulary for discussing the soft impacts of artefacts.
From the perspective of ethics, technological mediation draws attention to the responsibility of designers in shaping the actions of the users. ''Ethics, after all, is about the question of how to act, and technologies appear to give material answers to this question'' (Verbeek 2006, p. 369) . Verbeek suggests two possible approaches: assessing and preventing possible undesirable mediating effects, or intentionally designing desirable mediating effects. ''Morality then, in a sense, becomes part of the functionality of the product.'' These approaches of ''materialising morality'' are controversial, as Verbeek discusses. Firstly, because they would limit human freedom. Secondly, because they would give too much control to technology as opposed to democracy. However, the counterargument would be that technology Fig. 1 The role of technology in the intentional relation always limits freedom and exerts control, even when not explicitly designed. Aiming for desirable effects is then the best we can have. I will come back to the ethical perspective in a later section, and, as we will see, there are more options available in a service context. This may re-open the discussion on the desirability of designed mediation.
Other approaches
Several other approaches have discussed the impact of products. For example, design studies highlighted many ways in which products can influence the behaviour of their users (Lockton et al. 2010; Tromp et al. 2011) . Crime science studies have emphasised the ways in which artifacts in the environment of people may invite or inhibit crime, which is generally considered undesirable behaviour (Clarke 1992; Cornish and Clarke 2003) .
Two central themes from these approaches will be important for the analysis in this paper. Firstly, the crime science approach points in particular to the prevention of undesirable behaviour. Within the study of crime, different approaches focus either on the criminals or on the situations in which crime occurs. The latter approach is referred to as situational crime prevention (Clarke 1992) . Rather than studying how persons become criminals, it focuses on the possibilities to change the design of the environment to reduce the opportunities for crime.
Situational crime prevention makes use of the mediation relations identified in philosophy of technology (amplification, reduction, invitation and inhibition) to prevent undesirable behaviour. These may include mediation of perception in a background phenomenon such as graffiti (it is argued that removing graffiti changes the way in which the environment is perceived, and reduces crime by reducing provocations; Kelling and Bratton 1998), or mediation of behaviour by an alterity relation (putting a picture of eyes in a canteen prevents theft of food by removing excuses; Bateson et al. 2006) .
Secondly, it may not always be clear what undesirable (or desirable) behaviour is, and in the course of deterring undesirable behaviour, perfectly acceptable and valued behaviours may also be prevented. In digital rights management, the classical example is making copies for one's own use, which can be rendered impossible by copy protection mechanisms. Therefore, care needs to be taken to identify exactly which stakeholders maintain which values, and who therefore finds something (un)desirable.
Products versus services
In the previous section, I have discussed the postphenomenological framework of technological mediation, and related concepts. Technologies, from their place in the relation between humans and the world, may amplify or reduce aspects of experience, and invite or inhibit actions. Up to now, this framework has primarily been applied to things (i.e. tangible products). Although moves have been made towards virtual or intangible goods (Introna 2011) , the service concept has thus far remained invisible.
In order to evaluate the possibilities for applying the framework of technological mediation in an information service context, the first step to be taken is to define precisely which aspects of the intentional relation (I-technology-world) are different in such a context, as compared to the traditional thing-oriented examples in postphenomenology. To this end, we first discuss differences in the technology part, i.e. differences between products or things and (information) services.
Many different criteria have been suggested to distinguish products from services. The history can be traced back to Smith's notion of unproductive labour: productive labour leads to the accumulation of capital, whereas unproductive labour does not. Alternative criteria are whether the focus is on the thing or on the act (Hill 1999 , quoting Nassau Senior), and whether there is a transfer of ownership (Lovelock and Gummesson 2004) .
A dominant paradigm for a long time, the so-called IHIP characteristics (intangibility, heterogeneity, inseparability, and perishability; Zeithaml et al. 1996) have now become heavily debated as distinguishing properties of services. I will revisit each of these properties in an information context, to investigate what can and what cannot be said to apply to these particular services.
As for intangibility, the origins in the notion of unproductive labour led to overemphasising the intangible characteristic of services. As Hill (1999) points out, there are also intangible products, such as software products or copies of music. Although intangibility is not general characteristic of services, information services do fall in this class. Properties I discuss related to intangibility also apply to intangible products. In particular, the discussion above on hard versus soft impacts has an important implication for intangible goods: intangible goods do not have hard impacts.
Heterogeneity refers to the inability to guarantee quality or standardise properties of services, primarily because of the human element. If heterogeneity applies to information services at all, this not because of different performance of service workers (everything is automated), but because of the opportunities for personalisation/customisation and influence of other customers. Information services are ideally positioned for both, and I will discuss these issues in more detail later.
Inseparability (or simultaneity) refers to simultaneous production and consumption. Inseparability generally works for information services: although all kinds of information processing may take place behind the scenes as preparation, the service provider has to render the information when the customer visits the site. Information services are separable in terms of place, but not in terms of time. Also, the customer is actively involved in service production (like in social networking). As discussed in the introduction, the primary manifestation of the inseparability characteristic in information services is the knowledge on the side of the producer on how the service is used, and the ability to adjust the service in real-time.
Perishability refers to the inability to keep a stock of already produced services. This property is closely related to inseparability, as simultaneity of production and consumption implies the inability to produce in advance. Server capacity cannot be stored, but this is not really an issue, as infrastructure can nowadays be purchased as a service as well. What is indeed stored is lots of information. What perishes is the relevance (timeliness) of the information. I can store the Facebook output, but it will be worthless in a day, like a live broadcast of a football match. It is the value (in the economic sense) that is perishable.
I focus on two classes of properties of information services here. The first is the direct interaction between producer and consumer (provider and user), related to the notion of inseparability, as well as to the lack of transfer of ownership. The second is intangibility, related not so much to the service aspect, but rather to the informational nature. Both represent important differences from the things that have been the primary target of postphenomenology thus far.
For the concept of technological mediation, these differences are challenging. Up to now, the concept has focused on tangible, durable objects in the relation between one user and her world, which are designed at one point in time and used at another. In the design stage, the possible mediating effects could be taken into account. In the context of information services such as Facebook, the key assumptions of separation of design and use no longer hold. Although the central Facebook system doubtlessly has long-term development characteristics, the appearance to users certainly does not, and mediating effects depend on real-time actions of both provider and other users. There is no such thing as an identical good being delivered to multiple consumers. This leads to different relations, which do not only involve I, the technology, and the world, but also an active service provider as well as active co-users of the information service. I will discuss this in detail in the next section.
From a different perspective, one could say that a service-oriented concept of technological mediation would need to focus on the process as opposed to the thing. This was already mentioned by Nassau Senior, but it is the central aspect of the service notion as forwarded by Vargo and Lusch (2008) . Thus, service-oriented mediation would then discuss the mediating role of designed processes, in which things may or may not have an important role. Again, such processes may have different design inputs than things.
Often, aspects of products and services are combined, such as when the characteristics of a product are being determined by a service. The mobile phone is rather trivial here, but what if the engine capabilities of a car are determined by a chip that connects to a subscription service? Or what if the effectiveness of a digital pill is determined by how much you pay? Such examples from converging technologies often are examples of converging products and services as well. When capabilities of products are determined by services, the notion of service impact becomes relevant to these products.
Our question is how these (gradual) differences between products and services (and tangible and intangible products/services) would change the concept of technological mediation in an information service context.
Service impact
In order to understand (ethical) implications of service provisioning, we need a re-interpretation of philosophy of technology, in particular technological mediation, in the context of (information) services, based on the differences discussed above. As well as product impact, service impact can be understood from the perspective of mediation of experience and action. Concerning Ihde's classification of mediation of experience, Internet access providers typically deliver services that occur in background relations. In the relation between user and world, access to the Internet serves as the background for online experience, and most often draws attention when it somehow fails. By contrast, online games could be classified as alterity services, in which the user interacts with the game as quasi-other. Weather radar services are hermeneutic, providing the user an interpretation of the world. Webcams are embodiment services (Kamphof 2011) , allowing the user to extend her bodily capabilities through the web.
Although these examples suggest an easy transfer of the theory from products to services (or rather from product to service aspects of goods), the earlier discussion on the relation between design and use points to two important differences between product and service impact. Firstly, the intangible nature of information services suggests that information service impact is always soft impact. As the services do not have physical appearance and are often tailored to the user, all major effects seem to be mediated by the user. For example, if the use of Facebook would cause privacy problems, users could be instructed not to post any sensitive information. There is no ''thing'' that can be inspected for impact on the environment.
Information services do have environmental impact by consuming electricity and capacity on machines that require resources, leading to initiatives like Blackle (Google search with a black background to save power). However, these effects are ''second-order'' in the sense that they are caused by the physical storage and processing of the information rather than by the intangible information itself. For other services, such as car rental, the physical or product aspects may be a more integral part of the service, and thus environmental concerns would be more profound.
Thus, the characteristics of information services contribute to their understanding as neutral tools, more than their product sisters, because many undesirable effects can be attributed to the user. This also shows in the idea of ''net neutrality'' (Singer 2007) . Although this concept primarily refers to non-discrimination of Internet users, e.g. in terms of bandwidth, it can easily be taken to mean that information services are somehow morally neutral. This means that a philosophy of information service impact is particularly necessary to counter the neutrality thesis.
A second argument for the importance of a discussion on service impact stems from the relation between design and use, or inseparability. A producer of a product will typically not be aware of how it is used, at least not on the level of individual users. An Internet service provider can keep track of each click of each user, whether by login or by IP address. This is also related to the lack of transfer of ownership: the provider does not lose contact with the good after it is sold. This implies that the service provider can be aware of the way in which the service is used, including undesirable use.
The combination of intangibility and provider knowledge of use in information services has important consequences. When tangible products are designed for changing user behaviour, these effects may be based on physical properties. A speed hump may be annoying to users, and they may blame the designers for it, but when it is in place, its effects are relatively remote from design decisions. The mediation of user behaviour is based on an inherent physical property of the product, which cannot be changed very easily (the design can be changed only with effort; the physical property cannot be changed at all).
Conversely, when an Internet access provider decides to limit Internet traffic, this is an explicit setting that could be changed easily. The property that mediates behaviour is virtual rather than physical, or imposed rather than inherent (Blakley 1996) . Inherent properties (physical effects of a speed hump) feel less problematic than imposed properties (settings that deny access), because the properties themselves cannot be changed. In Floridi's terms, changing settings in services involves less ontological friction than changing the design of products (Floridi 2005) . As the provider also knows how the service is used, it can easily adjust the service based on usage patterns, or even behaviour of individual users.
The conclusion is that (1) an information service provider has more knowledge than a product producer on how the good is used, and (2) an information service provider has more opportunities than a product producer to change the properties of the good (for particular users) on the fly. However, because (3) many effects (desirable or undesirable) of information services can be said to be caused by the user, the incentive to adjust the service may not always be obvious. The responsibility question therefore becomes even more profound than in the case of products, and an explicit treatment of service impact is needed.
In the following, I discuss the different ''actors'' in information service provisioning in more detail, and describe how their role is different from their role in product contexts. I will then integrate these differences in a re-interpretation of technological mediation for information services.
The user
Users do influence products in the sense that they use products in their own practices, which may or may not coincide with what was intended in the design stage. Also, many products provide the user with options to change settings, especially when ICT is involved. These settings will in turn influence the mediation of the relation userworld by the product.
However, in the case of information services, there are some differences. First of all, the way in which the user uses the service may lead the provider to adjust the service. For example, advertisements may be shown that relate to the user's interest, or an account may be suspended altogether based on undesirable use of the service. Therefore, any behaviour may lead to changes in the service, not just explicit adjustment of settings. As the user cannot always know what will change the properties of the service, this is difficult to predict and steer.
While the service provider can personalise services based on information obtained about the user, there are often also opportunities for the user herself to personalise her service explicitly. For example, users can indicate their interests in news services, or users can change their sharing settings on social networking services. This is in itself not a difference from the product perspective, but because the service provider will know the settings chosen, also other properties may change based on these settings. In particular, a ''bias'' may be created in the service, such that the user only sees information that matches her profile.
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Information services thus provide ideal opportunities for personalisation based on information obtained about the user. In particular, these opportunities may be used for preventing undesirable use, not only of the service itself, but also of connected products. A standard example is sending someone a warning when she purchases too much high-fat food at a supermarket, using data from her personal discount card. Without approval from the user, most of us would probably find this problematic. With approval from the user, however, personalised impact may be more acceptable than collective impact, as the user can steer herself towards positively evaluated decisions. Thaler and Sunstein (2008) speak about ''nudging'' people by design in the context of ''libertarian paternalism'', where choices can be influenced without making certain options impossible, by giving the right push in the design of the environment.
Finally, in information services, users themselves often (co-)create the information context. Again, Facebook is an obvious example here. It can be argued that one's Facebook profile is more than just service settings. The information provided on the profile, as well as the friends selected, will profoundly change the appearance of the service, and thereby it's mediation potential. When selecting ''bad'' friends, the service is more likely to invite ''bad'' behaviour from its position in the relation userworld.
Other users
Next to a direct relation with the service provider, information services may also provide the user with direct relations with other users. Whereas with products, I may not know who else purchased the product unless they are friends, with services the coupled service instances for different users may provide me with features that depend on the presence of others, such as recommendations (''you may also like…'') or status updates, which are based on how others use the service. This means that these other users will have a role in the impact the service has on me as well. In social networking, users interact continuously by responding to each other's posts, thereby for example generating ''trending topics''. The service emerges from the combined user efforts. My input changes the mediation exercised by the service offered to other users, and vice versa.
A specific issue in relation to the role of other users in service impact is the importance of mediating what can be called defensive behaviour. Apart from inhibiting undesirable behaviour directly, by aiming to design the service according to situational crime prevention principles, the service domain gives greater opportunity for involving users in the defence against undesirable behaviour as well. Inviting defensive behaviour is more important in services than in products, as users can more easily influence each other's service instances. A notable example here is the reporting by users of illegal or offensive content (spam, copyrighted pictures, sexual content). This partly relieves the site owners of monitoring all content themselves. While users continuously shape each other's service experience, in this case responsibility for maintaining desirable service properties is explicitly outsourced.
The service provider Service providers, in contrast to product manufacturers, have easy access to knowledge about use. A laundry service knows which customers use the service when, and even for which cloths. For intangible information services, this is even more so, as the information is already available in digital form, and can therefore easily be processed. This means that the provider has more opportunities to adjust the service to specific customers, or to general usage patterns.
Furthermore, intangible services allow relatively easy changes in properties. These may be as simple as changing a setting in a configuration file, for example changing the default privacy setting for all users. But even when software changes are required, these changes are far less invasive than after-sales changes to products, as the software can just be changed on the server side, without any distribution efforts. Information services never need a factory recall to be adjusted. 1 Moreover, constructions around ownership are different than in the context of products. There is ownership of the data, but typically users do not obtain ownership of the data when using a service. Rather, users often supply the service provider with data, like in social networking. In many information services, the consumer even transfers ownership of data to the producer, depending on the terms of service. Again, the service provider obtains more information about the users, and has therefore more opportunities to adjust the service.
For technological mediation, this means that, in contrast to product manufacturers, service providers have an active and direct role in the mediation. For inseparable services, the service provider features in the mediation equation itself, not just as an input variable to a fixed product.
Mediation revisited
We have seen in the previous sections that, in principle, the theory of technological mediation could be applied to services fairly straightforwardly. However, the different relation between design and use, and the implications thereof as discussed in the preceding section, suggest adaptations to the theory when applied to services, following the different roles of user, other users, and service provider.
In the traditional theory of technological mediation as advanced by Ihde and Verbeek, one individual (the one using the technology) features prominently in the different mediation schemas. For example, the embodiment relation is represented as (I-technology)-world, and the hermeneutic relation as I-(technology-world). Obviously, this makes perfect sense in the case of, say, binoculars or thermometers. However, in the case of services, we have both personalisation and the effect of the behaviour of other users. The technology (service) is not fixed, but continuously changed by personalisation (by the user and the service provider) and behaviour of other users. Therefore, not only the relation I-technology-world should be included, but also the service provider and other users. The general relation would then look like the ''plus'' in Fig. 2 .
We have already seen that service providers can adjust their services on the fly, which is accounted for by the presence of the service provider in the mediation schema. However, based on the ''plus'', a different type of mediation becomes possible as well. Obviously, the service provider can change the service (e.g. by personalisation) to achieve a different service impact, but the service provider may also try to first mediate the behaviour of certain users in order to mediate the behaviour of others, by the effect that the former have on the service received by the latter. Of this second-order mediation the possibilities to encourage defensive behaviour constitute an example. In this process, also the experience of responsibility of the targets of mediation could be changed, in terms of the extent to which they feel responsible for the quality of the service, and the experience and behaviour of its users.
Moreover, the user that is invited to defensive behaviour may be the same user as the target. In that case, I would be invited to defensive behaviour with respect to my own actions, i.e. defensive behaviour to prevent my own offensive behaviour. An example would be an invitation to reconsider my privacy settings in a social networking site, in order to prevent myself from posting in a public environment things I might regret later. Thus, influencing the behaviour of service users may not only apply to defensive behaviour with respect to the use others make of the system, but also to my own use. This ''self-mediation'' is where the nudges appear in the mediation perspective. Whether we can really speak of self-mediation will depend on whether the user explicitly endorses the designed impact, or whether it is merely imposed by the provider.
In a product-service system setting, the service can thus be used to influence the use of the product through secondorder mediation: the service may invite the user to behave in a way that will change the product-service system such that desirable use of the product is encouraged, thereby for example improving sustainability. In this sense, a user may participate in a service to voluntarily change the properties of her car (through a chip that regulates the properties via a connection to the service) to reduce fuel consumption. Soft impact of services may thus be used to change hard impact of products. Table 1 summarises the roles of the different stakeholders, and how information services may change their experience and action possibilities as compared to tangible products. In particular, the opportunities to influence the service enable second-order mediation, i.e. mediating the behaviour of stakeholders which in turn mediates the experience and/or behaviour of other stakeholders.
In phenomenological terms, the co-constitution of subject and world from intentional relation is different in such creations, as there is not a static product but a dynamic service (process) in the relation. As Verbeek already mentions, a phenomenological perspective can never accept that the technologies that mediate the constitution of subjects and objects in the intentional relation are themselves somehow pre-objectified: ''The thought that technological artefacts possess intrinsic properties and can themselves influence the relation between human beings and world supposes that technology can be spoken about independently of the humans that engage with it'' (Verbeek 2005, 17) . Instead, from a phenomenological perspective, the technologies themselves are constructed in the way they are used, i.e. they are assigned properties based on the context (carefully avoiding reference to pre-determined physical properties here). Verbeek does not seem to radicalise this statement into the conclusion that subject, object and technology are all constituted from the relation. From a product perspective, this might indeed be a too radical conclusion to keep up with common sense: how would binoculars be ''constituted'' from their use? However, as service properties are influenced by the interaction with the service, such a radicalisation would be perfectly explainable to non-philosophers and non-phenomenologists: the properties do ''really'' change when the service is being used.
As an example, consider an online social networking service. Both personalisation and second-order mediation are essential to understand the impact of such a service. From a provider perspective, the quality may be for instance be improved by (a) personalisation, (b) making users add more information, and (c) making users report offensive content. Where (a) can be understood from the relation Iservice-world, by adding the idea of constitution of the service from the relation, (b) and (c) require the perspective of second-order mediation to understand the impact of the service on a particular user, as the impact will be determined by the effect the design of the service has on other users. For example, the quality of my service will be improved if the provider changes the design such that other users are invited to provide more information, or to report offensive content (which will then be removed). This will in turn mediate my own experience and behaviour.
An interesting question for future research would be which different types of relations we can distinguish here, i.e. which connections should be put within parentheses in different situations (complementary to embodiment, hermeneutic, alterity, and background). For example, webshop recommendations make other users only appear as background, in the sense that the recommendations are based on other users' behaviour, but this is not apparent from the recommendations themselves, without knowledge of the system behind them. Facebook relates the user to other users directly, by providing representations and user-generated content of these other users. In this sense, different relations between user, service provider, other users, and the world can be distinguished, similar to Ihde's embodiment, hermeneutic, alterity and background relations for products. In this paper, I will leave this question aside and focus on the ethical consequences of this generalisation of technological mediation.
Ethical implications
In the previous sections, we have seen how information services challenge the paradigm of technological mediation. By the inseparability of production and consumption, service providers as well as other users can contribute directly to the mediating effect of the service. In this section, we will look at the different stakeholders again from the perspective of responsibility. How does the inseparability of information services change responsibilities of stakeholders? I will use the classification of responsibilities provided by Ahmed and Van den Hoven (2010) .
The user
For the user, the question is what changes in her responsibility for responsible use of the good at hand, when this is an information service rather than a product. Following the results of the previous section, we observe two main differences. Firstly, users are not only responsible for using the service in a responsible way, but also for co-designing the service in such a way that they can use it responsibly. Secondly, users may or may not have a similar responsibility for co-designing the service of other users in such a way that these other users can use the service responsibly.
One way for the user to be involved in co-design of the service is being active when it comes to personalisation of the service. Information services are full of action-directed personalisation already, mostly in persuasive forms of personalised advertisements and recommendations. When the user explicitly consents to the mediation, more coercive forms may become acceptable. Apart from designing for collective values such as health, services could thus be tailored to the individual values of the user, thereby encouraging her to take the actions that she would endorse. One can envision the user setting a maximum time per day for the Internet connection, in order to prevent addiction. As this conforms to the values of the individual, this cannot be classified as discriminatory, even though it discriminates between users. Rather, this is a perfectly acceptable form of personalisation, and such forms are more easily applicable to services than to products. More related to health than to values, such services already exist in the form of prevention of repetitive strain injury, by means of attempting to make the user pause when working with a computer. The user may thus assume responsibility for changing the settings in such a way that she can use the service responsibly.
Personalised impact of services will thus most likely be acceptable if either the personalised aspects are clearly visible and can be changed, or if the user explicitly consented to the personalised impact. This leaves some autonomy with the user, and even though she may choose to have her autonomy mediated to avoid having to make decisions all the time, at least this meta-autonomy, i.e. autonomy in deciding about the extent to which one wants to be autonomous, is preserved. 2 If I participate in the design of my services by personalising them, I can actively manipulate the service impact on my own experience and behaviour. Concerns remain about the impact of ''default'' settings, profiling the user without her consent, and tunnel vision due to personalised services, but the notion of meta-autonomy seems unavoidable in this context. In the age of ''information overload '' and ''moral overload'' (Van den Hoven et al. 2012) , it may be a very important concept to maintain personal values in the face of persuasive communications.
Van den Hoven (1998) argued that designers have ''meta-task responsibility'', meaning that they have a responsibility to ensure that users can act responsibly when using the designed system. Using this concept, it can be argued that in the context of information services, users share the meta-task responsibility with the provider. As users co-design the service, they also co-design the mediation, and thereby the way in which the service encourages responsible or irresponsible use.
Other users
In relation to the role of users, two questions emerge. First, what is the responsibility of service users in relation to the mediating effect of the service for other users? Second, to what extent is it acceptable that the service provider invites or enforces such responsibility?
In an information service context, users become-at least partly-designers of the service for other users. This means that the experience of other users depends on their decision, and they can therefore contribute to amplifying desirable experience and inviting desirable use by other users. However, as they have no formal relation with the other users, it would seem that there is no moral (and certainly no legal) responsibility to do so. It may be argued though that the notion of social responsibility would apply, as the users themselves contribute to the overall effect of the information service on society. As co-designers, users would then share the social responsibility of contributing to positive and socially acceptable impact. This is not the case with products, as users cannot influence the product of other users merely by the way in which they use their own product.
For the service provider, it can be beneficial if service users assist in improving the experience for other users, and in particular invite desirable use and inhibit undesirable use among other users. A well-known example is allowing users to report offensive or illegal content. In such a case, the responsibility that comes with knowledge about use, which is first and foremost applicable to the provider, seems to be delegated to service users. Although assisting in dealing with this responsibility may to a certain extent improve the experience of users, the question is what the conditions are under which this arrangement is morally acceptable. Users can certainly not be held responsible if they do not report offensive content, and it would therefore be problematic if users are forced to label content. Persuasive invitations to assist in improving the service (Tromp et al. 2011) would be the most acceptable form here, although care should be taken not to overload users with moral decisions (Van den Hoven et al. 2012 ).
In the above, we have assumed that the service provider somehow benefits from users contributing to service quality and desirable use. However, there may also be cases in which users may contribute to each other's desirable use without the service provider receiving any benefit. For example, social network users may share information about privacy policies, thereby encouraging each other to be careful with private information, which is not in the interest of the social network service provider. Again, the question is who determines what desirable use is.
The service provider Earlier, we referred to the possibilities to design mediation into products, as discussed by Verbeek. When producers of products want to do this, they have to act in the design stage, before the things are manufactured and shipped to consumers. I have referred to the ethical discussion around designed mediation, and the question whose values are actually embedded.
As outlined above, service providers have knowledge of use, and can adjust the design of the service on the fly. They can suspend accounts, or report illegal use to the authorities. It can be argued that, because of the increased knowledge and increased possibilities for action, information service providers also have an increased responsibility for desirable use, and for supporting user and public values. In legal terms, an ''indirect liability'' can be said to exist when the providers knowingly facilitate illegal use (Pieters and van Cleeff 2009 ). This responsibility, however, is not always welcomed by the providers.
Following lawsuits against peer-to-peer network applications, accused of hosting illegal content, providers designed their systems such that they could not know about infringement, by decentralised indexing and encryption. Services can thus be designed such as to design away the responsibility. The service still has impact on the behaviour of users, but the behaviour remains hidden from the provider. In this case, the service provider aims to give her service the characteristics of a product: when sold, she can no longer know about the use that is made of it. She tries to remove the service provider from the equation of technological mediation in services (the ''plus'' of Fig. 2) , and to avoid the knowledge of use that is implied by the simultaneous production and consumption.
In the design of services, their mediating role in the relation between the user, the service provider, other users, and the world can thus be changed in such a way that responsibilities are reorganised. The differences between technological mediation for products and for information services seem to imply a trade-off in design with respect to moving the design towards the product or service end of the continuum (or: making the service less or more ''frozen''). As the different characteristics involve different kinds of responsibilities, as identified above, such tradeoffs are moral decisions themselves. This entails a metaresponsibility for the arrangement of these responsibilities, assigned to the designer of the service, which may or may not be the same entity as the service provider. The specific way a service functions as a mediator in the relation between user, provider and other users should therefore be subject to conscious design decisions.
To design away service provider responsibility, as in the peer-to-peer case, would seem ethically problematic from this perspective. With products, the lack of knowledge about use is an inherent property, whereas with services, it could only be imposed. Again, the imposing here needs justification, and no meaningful moral justification of designing away responsibility has yet been proposed. If designing away responsibility is considered problematic, service providers may instead focus on available options to operate within the pressure to design ethical service impact.
From this point of view, providers have more options than product producers. With products, desirable use often equals what either the producer or the authorities find desirable. Policy values can be embedded into products (e.g. a warning on cigarettes), often in terms of precaution, but they are easy targets for arguments of paternalism. The alternative, ''neutrality'', in order to ''let users decide for themselves'', is equally problematic, as values are always embedded in technology, even when not intended.
In the case of services, because the provider has knowledge of use and users, different options become available for designed mediation. Rather than a one-sizefits all solution, services could be tailored to particular users. Again, this comes in two flavours. One could still aim at public or policy values, but personalise the service to achieve this. For example, Internet connection time could be limited for users with a high risk of addiction. This ''profiling'' is still subject to debate. But lastly, information services can allow users to adjust settings themselves, or potentially even select their values, thereby supporting their personal values rather than public or policy values. For example, Facebook can be adjusted according to personal privacy values, and personal privacy assistants could even allow balancing different personal values for a host of different online services. These options are summarised in Table 2 .
When a choice for one or more of these options has been made, either voluntarily or involuntarily, mechanisms can then be designed to support these values in service design, by mediating the experience and action. In particular, service providers could investigate the possibilities of exploiting second-order mediation to design acceptable forms of encouragement of desirable use into their services. The design can then invite users to contribute to the design in order to invite desirable use. In this way, the provider can take on her meta-task responsibility for enabling users to act responsibly (Van den Hoven 1998). To support user autonomy, it would be advisable to focus on transparency of these measures, especially when user data is collected to support service impact (cf. Gutwirth and De Hert 2008) .
Conclusions
In this article, I have outlined how the framework of technological mediation, originating from a phenomenology of things, can be used in the context of information services. Properties that distinguish services from products, although far from providing a complete classification, do point to important differences that impact the application of the framework. In particular, I have pointed to the following issues:
1. In information services, the provider can change the properties of the service on the fly. This makes personalisation possible, but it also paves the way for possible privacy violations. Because the service provider has more knowledge and more opportunity for action in case of problematic effects of the service, there is an increased responsibility. However, there are General service impact Neutrality Precaution more options for designed mediation than in a product context, which are also potentially less problematic. 2. In information services, the user can easily adjust the service to her own needs. This also brings increased responsibility, as the user is now a co-designer of the service that mediates her experience and existence. When the provider supports personal values by enabling personalisation of the service, the user needs to adjust the service to these values. The provider can design second-order mediation to encourage the user to do this. 3. In information services, the user can also influence the mediating effect of the service on other users. In social networking, this is even the key design feature. The mediating effect of such influence again leads to increased responsibility, which may or may not be emphasised in the design.
Earlier, I announced that I would discuss possible generalisation from information services to other services. First of all, the issues outlined above do not apply to intangible products, such as product software, as the relation between production and consumption is no different in intangible products than in tangible ones. In principle, changing intangible products would be easier than changing tangible products, but the producer is not in the position to do this. Even for ''pure'' software products, there is a single moment of interaction when ownership is transferred. Only when such products are combined with services (updates, user feedback, etc.) do the considerations outlined here apply. Such combinations are indeed easier than for tangible products, as intangible products already consist of information used in an information system. Similarly, as modern cars already contain quite some ICT, it is relatively easy to extend them with services (in the so-called Internet of Things). Now consider a service that is both tangible and separable, for example a shoe repair or dry cleaning service. In this case, immediate consumption is not an issue, and only the moment of delivery needs to be simultaneous for producer and consumer. In this case the influence of other users, as outlined above, seems to be rather minimal. Still, the provider does gain some knowledge on how users use the service, and there is also some possibility for personalisation, as there is contact between producer and consumer beyond the single moment of transfer of ownership in the product case. Here, the intangible, information-based nature of the services we discussed merely makes it easier to tweak and to personalise, because the process can easily be automated.
Thus, the discussion of mediation by services is not limited to information services, although those have been the main focus in this research. One could argue that at least part of the discussion applies in a broad sense to what has been called ''reconfigurable technology'' (Dechesne et al. 2011) , as the increased responsibility stems from increased possibilities induced by being able to change the design on the fly, both for producers and for consumers. In this context, the presented framework can assist in co-creation methods for service design, and enable ''actual experiences of users as drivers for service transformations'' (Henze et al. 2012) .
From the perspective of product-service systems, where there is a clear distinction between products and services, the above provides a framework to apply technological mediation to the service aspects of the product-service system, rather than the product only. From the perspective of service-dominant logic, where products are one particular form of delivering service, it provides a generalisation of the theory of technological mediation to the larger class. In this interpretation, the original approach as advanced by Verbeek is a special case of the more general framework. Precisely because products are ''frozen'' or indirect services, the entanglement with producer and other users that appears in information services disappears when it is merely ''thinging things'' that appear in the intentional relation. From both points of view, it becomes possible to extend the application of the theory of technological mediation beyond the realm of the tangible, separable, and/ or transferable.
